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Is There a Unique Physical Entropy? Micro versus
Macro
Entropy in Statistical Physics
The concept of entropy has become common even in everyday language,
in which it rather vaguely refers to disorder, loss of “energy”, waste and
dissipation. Users of the concept generally take it for granted that in the
background there is a precise scientific notion, with which one should be
able to justify, at least in principle, this informal parlance. It is there-
fore perhaps surprising to find that even in the exact sciences entropy is a
multi-faceted concept. It is perhaps least controversial in probability and
information theory, at least as far as its mathematical expression is con-
cerned: S = −
∑
i
pi ln pi is the generally accepted formula for the entropy
S of a probability distribution {pi}. But even in the mathematical fields
of probability and information theory the exact significance of entropy, and
the role that it can play in, e.g., decision theoretical contexts, remains to
some extent controversial. One might hope that this will be different once
the use of entropy in physics is considered. After all, in physics one expects
that the term “entropy” will correspond to something that is accessible to
measurement–and drastic differences of opinion about something that can
be measured would be surprising. It is this physical entropy, in statistical
physics and in thermodynamics, that we shall be concerned with in this
paper.
For the case of M equiprobable events, pi = 1/M , the formula S =
−
∑
i
pi ln pi reduces to S = lnM . Essentially, this is the famous formula
S = k lnW that can be traced back to Ludwig Boltzmann’s seminal 1877
paper about the relation between the second law of thermodynamics and
probability theory (Boltzmann 1877, 2001). The constant k (Boltzmann’s
constant) is merely introduced in order to fix the unit; and W is the num-
ber of microstates corresponding to a given macrostate—it is a number of
possibilities like M in the earlier formula. The macrostate is defined by
macroscopic quantities like pressure, volume and temperature (in the case
of a gas in a container); W is the number of microscopic states, character-
ized by the positions and velocities of the atoms or molecules in the gas, that
each give rise to the same values of these macroscopic quantities and in this
sense belong to the same macrostate. Boltzmann’s entropy thus is basically
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the earlier introduced S for the case of a probability distribution that as-
signs equal probabilities to all microstates belonging to a given macrostate.
Since the microstates can be represented as points in the phase space of
the physical system, the formula S = k lnW tells us that the entropy of a
macrostate is proportional to the logarithm of the volume in microscopic
phase space that corresponds to the macrostate.
A paradigmatic and simple application of S = k lnW is the case of N
classical particles (atoms or molecules), each of which can be in any one ofX
possible states. In this case we find W = XN , and therefore S = kN lnX .
Entropy in Thermodynamics
In thermodynamics, physical systems are considered from a purely macro-
scopic point of view. In the case of a gas in a container one looks at changes
in macroscopically measurable quantities when the pressure P , volume V
and temperature T are made to vary. An essential result, at the basis of the
so-called second law of thermodynamics, is that different ways of going from
one macroscopic state A to another macroscopic state B (for example, by
either first compressing and then cooling, or doing these things in reversed
order) are generally associated with different amounts of exchanged heat
∆Q. The heat content of a physical system is therefore not a quantity fixed
by its macroscopic state: it is not a state function. However, the quantity∫ B
A
dQ/T , i.e. the exchanged heat divided by the temperature, integrated
along a path from A to B (in the macroscopic state space) that represents
a reversible process, is path-independent. That means that
∫
O
dQ/T does
define a state function (the choice of the fiducial state O defines the zero of
this function; different choices of O lead to functions that differ by a con-
stant). It is this macroscopic state function that defines the thermodynamic
entropy: S ≡
∫
dQ/T .
Boltzmann’s seminal 1877 idea was that the statistical entropy S =
k lnW (Boltzmann himself used another notation) is the microscopic coun-
terpart of the thermodynamic entropy. Each macroscopic state corresponds
to a volume in phase space on the micro level, namely the volume occupied
by all those microstates that give rise to the macrostate in question; and
the logarithm of this volume represents (apart from immaterial constants)
the thermodynamic entropy of the macrostate.
A discrepancy
If the micro and macro entropies stand for one and the same physical
quantity, the two entropies should obviously depend in exactly the same
way on all variables. As it turns out, however, this necessary requirement
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is not fulfilled. The macro-entropy is extensive: if we scale up a physical
system by increasing its particle number, its energy and its volume by a
factor λ, its entropy will increase by this same factor λ. In other terms,
S(λN, λV, λE) = λS(N, V,E). But the micro-entropy as defined above is
not extensive.
To see this, imagine two gas-filled chambers of the same volume, sepa-
rated by a partition. Both chambers contain equal amounts of the same gas
in equilibrium, consisting of the same number N of particles. Both parts
have the same total energy, temperature T and pressure. Now the partition
is removed. What happens to the entropy?
According to thermodynamics the entropy remains the same, because
the macroscopic properties of the gases do not change. Smooth removal of
the partition is a reversible process without heat transfer; therefore SA =
SB, with A andB the macrostates before and after the removal, respectively.
So the total entropy of the double amount of gas, without the partition, is
the same as the combined entropy of the two original volumes, i.e. double
the entropy of each of the two halves (in this it has been taken for granted
that the entropy of several isolated systems is additive—see van Kampen
1984).
However, from the microscopic point of view, the number of available
states per particle doubles when the partition is taken out: each particle
now has twice as much phase space available to it as it had before. If the
number of available states per particle was X with the partition still in
place, it becomes 2X after the removal of the partition. This means that
the number of microstates goes up, from WA = X
2N to WB = (2X)
2N ,
which corresponds to an entropy difference SB − SA = 2kN ln 2.
This discrepancy, known as (a version of) the Gibbs paradox, shows
that although the thermodynamic entropy is extensive (it doubles when
the amount of gas is doubled), the statistical mechanical entropy is not. If
we think that there is one and only one physical entropy, this difference
between the two approaches signals a problem that needs to be solved.
Only one of the two expressions can be right in this case, and since we
can directly measure the thermodynamic entropy, and verify its value, it
seems clear that the Boltzmann formula S = k lnW must be wrong. There
are two approaches in the literature that take this line. Both claim that
fundamental reasoning, starting from first principles on the microscopic
level, will not lead to the expression S = k lnW , but instead to the formula
S = k lnW/N !, with N the number of particles. This modification of the
expression is sufficient to remove our discrepancy.
Remarkably, the two approaches have diametrically opposite starting
points: the first, traditional one claims that the indistinguishability of par-
ticles of the same kind must be taken into account and that this necessitates
the insertion of 1/N !. The second approach says that the distinguishability
of classical particles has been neglected.
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The standard “solution”: indistinguishability of
particles of the same kind
The traditional way of responding to the discrepancy between micro and
macro entropy is to point out that the particles (atoms or molecules) in the
two gas chambers are “identical”: since they are all atoms or molecules of
the same gas, they all possess the same intrinsic properties (charge, mass,
etc.). Therefore, a permutation of two or more of these particles should
not lead to a new state: it cannot make a difference whether particle 1 is
in state a and particle 2 in state b, or the other way around. Both cases
equally represent one particle in a and one particle of the same type in b. If
we go along with this, the number of microstates W must be adjusted: for
a system of N identical particles it must be a factor N ! smaller than what
we supposed above. When we now redo the calculation, the removal of the
partition between the two chambers changes W from WA = X
2N/(N !)2
to WB = (2X)
2N/(2N)!. With the help of Stirling’s approximation for
the factorial it follows that, in the so-called thermodynamic limit N →∞,
WB =WA. So the total entropy does not change when the partition is taken
out: the resulting double-volume amount of gas has double the entropy
of each of the separate chambers. This removes the discrepancy between
statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.
According to several authors and textbooks, in the final analysis quan-
tum theory is needed for justifying this solution of the Gibbs paradox
(see e.g. Schro¨dinger 1948, Huang 1963, Wannier 1966, Sommerfeld 1977,
Schroeder 2000, Ben-Naim 2007). Indeed, classical particles are always dis-
tinguishable by their positions, which are strictly correlated to their individ-
ual trajectories. These trajectories, in other words the particles’ histories,
individuate the particles: if we give the particles names on the basis of their
positions at one instant, these names persist through time. So the situa-
tion in which particle 1 is in state a at a later time is different from the
situation in which 2 is in a. It is therefore not self-evident in classical statis-
tical mechanics that we should divide by N !. Identical quantum particles,
on the other hand, seem indistinguishable in the required sense from the
start, because quantum states of systems of identical particles must either
be symmetrical under permutation (bosons) or anti-symmetrical (fermions):
exchange of particles leaves the state therefore invariant (apart from a global
phase factor) and the multiplicity N ! never enters.
If this argument were correct, then the non-extensivity of the Boltz-
mann entropy would show that classical physics is inconsistent and that the
world must be quantum mechanical. But obviously, it is hard to believe
that simple considerations about doubling amounts of gases could produce
such fundamental insights. Unsurprisingly therefore, doubts have been ex-
pressed concerning the just-mentioned traditional solution of the paradox.
For example, some authors have claimed that identical classical particles are
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also fully indistinguishable, and that this justifies the factor 1/N ! without
any recourse to quantum mechanics (e.g., Hestenes 1970, Fujita 1991, Nagle
2004, Saunders 2006).
In the next section we shall take a closer look at whether the per-
mutation of classical particles does or does not make a difference for the
microstate.
Permutations of “identical” classical particles
We already observed that classical particles can be named and distin-
guished by their different histories. A process in which two classical particles
of the same kind are interchanged can therefore certainly produce a differ-
ent microstate. Indeed, imagine a situation in which there is one particle at
position x1 and one particle at position x2, and in which at a later instant
there is again one particle at x1 and one at x2; suppose that their respec-
tive momenta are the same as before. What has happened in the meantime?
There are two possibilities: either the particle that was first at x1 is later
again at x1 and the particle that was first at x2 is later again at x2, or the
particles have exchanged their positions. The latter case would clearly be
different from the former one: it corresponds to a different physical process.
Although it is true that the two final situations cannot be distinguished
on the basis of their instantaneous properties, their different histories show
that the particle at x1 in one final situation is not the same as the particle
at x1 in the other final situation.
These remarks seem trivial; so what is behind the denial by some authors
that identical classical particles can be distinguished and that permutations
give rise to different microstates? One reason is that there is an ambiguity in
the meaning of the terms “distinguishable” and “permutation”. Consider
the following statements: “Two particles are distinguishable if they can
always be selectively separated by a filter” (Hestenes 1970); “Two particles
are distinguishable if they are first identified as 1 and 2, put into a small
box, shaken up, and when removed one can identify which particle was the
original number 1” (Nagle 2004). With these definitions of distinguishability
particles of the same kind are indeed indistinguishable. The concept of
“permutation” can be interpreted in a similar way. Consider again the
microstate of two particles of the same kind, one at x1 and another at x2.
If the particle at x2 were at x1 instead, and the particle at x1 were at
x2, with all properties interchanged, there would be no physical differences,
neither from an observational point of view nor from the viewpoint of theory.
One can therefore certainly maintain that the two situations are only two
different descriptions (using different ways of assigning indices) for one and
the same physical situation (Fujita 1991).
But this is a different kind of permutation from the physical exchange
we considered before. In our first example the particles moved from x1 to x2
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and vice versa. Trajectories in space-time connected the initial state to the
permuted state. By contrast, in the alternative reading of “permutation”
just mentioned, the exchange is not a physical process at all. Instead, it is
an instantaneous swapping that occurs in our thought; it exchanges nothing
but indices and does not need trajectories.
A similar sense of “permutation” is employed by Saunders (Saunders
2006). Consider one particle a that follows trajectory 1 and another par-
ticle b of the same kind that follows trajectory 2. Now imagine the case
in which particle a followed trajectory 2 and particle b followed trajectory
1. This exchange would not make any difference for the physical situation.
As before, the states before and after a permutation of this kind are not
connected by a physical process. A permutation in this sense swaps a sup-
posedly existing abstract “identity” (formally represented by the particle
indices “1” and “2”, respectively) that is completely independent of the
physical characteristics of the situation.
The upshot of these considerations is that if “permutation” is under-
stood as a physical exchange in which trajectories in space-time connect the
initial state to the permuted state, then permutations give rise to physically
different possibilities, in the sense of different physical processes. If “permu-
tation” is however understood in a different way, then it may well be true
that such permutations are not associated with any physical differences and
so do not lead to a new microstate.
Let us now consider which kind of permutations is relevant to statistical
mechanics—physical exchanges, with connecting trajectories, or swapping
indices? Which kind of permutations determines the number of microstates
W?
Remember our two gas-filled chambers, each containing N identical par-
ticles. Before the removal of the partition the number of available states per
particle is X . After the partition has been removed, the number of available
states has become 2X . The reason is that after the partition’s removal it
has become possible for the particles to move to the other chamber. The
doubling of the number of available microstates thus expresses a physical
freedom that did not exist before the partition was taken away: trajectories
have become possible from the particles’ initial states to states in the other
chamber.
In contrast, even with the partition in place we could consider, in
thought, the permutation of “particle identities”, or indices, from the left
and right sides, respectively—but such permutations are never taken into
account in the calculation of the number of microstates. Nor do we con-
sider permutations with particles of the same kind outside of the container,
obviously. In other words, the relevant kind of permutations are physical
exchanges, not the abstract swapping of indices or identities.
To completely justify the answer that accessibility via a real physical
process is the determining factor in the calculation of the number of mi-
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crostates, we would have to go deeper into the foundations of statistical
mechanics. Here, we only mention that one important approach in this area
is the ergodic theory, in which the probability of a macrostate is argued to
be proportional to the associated volume in phase space on the grounds
that this volume is proportional to the amount of time a system will actu-
ally dwell in that part of phase space that corresponds to the macrostate
in question. Clearly, this idea only makes sense if the microstates in this
part of the phase space are actually accessible via physical trajectories: mi-
crostates that give rise to the same macrostate but cannot be reached from
the initial situation through the evolution of the system are irrelevant for
the macrostate’s probability—they do not play a role at all.
It is true that the original form of the ergodic hypothesis (according
to which all microstates are actually visited in a relatively short time) has
proven to be untenable, but this does not impugn the basic idea that acces-
sibility is the criterion for the relevance of microstates. The multiplicities
that occur in more modern and more sophisticated approaches to the foun-
dations of statistical mechanics are the same as those of the original ergodic
theory.
We can therefore conclude that in classical statistical mechanics the
relevant number of microstates is sensitive to the number of ways this
macrostate can be reached via physical processes, i.e. different paths in
phase space. Given N particles, there are generally N ! different ways in
which the particles that have been numbered at some initial time can be
distributed in a state at a later time. These permutations represent dif-
ferent physical possibilities, corresponding to different physical processes.
Dividing by N ! is therefore unjustified when we calculate the numbers of
microstates that can be realized by classical particles of the same kind1.
An alternative “solution”: distinguishability of
particles of the same kind
In a number of recent publications, Swendsen has proposed an alter-
native line of reasoning that leads to the entropy formula S = k lnW/N !;
he claims that this derivation, rather than the standard accounts, captures
the essence of Boltzmann’s 1877 ideas (e.g., Swendsen 2002, Swendsen 2008,
Swendsen 2012). Swendsen’s strategy is to calculate the entropy of a system
by considering it as a part of a bigger, composite system; and then to look at
the probabilities of microstates of this composite system. Boltzmann’s 1877
definition is interpreted as saying that the logarithm of this probability dis-
1 A more detailed discussion should also take into account that the division by
N ! is without significance anyway as long as N is constant: in this case the
only effect of the division is that the entropy is changed by a constant term
lnN !, see (Versteegh 2011).
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tribution is the entropy of the composite system (apart from multiplicative
and additive constants).
Let us illustrate Swendsen’s approach by combining a system consisting
of a gas of volume V1 and particle number N1 with a second gas of the
same kind, with volume V2 and particle number N2. Let us denote the
total volume by V : V = V1 + V2. The total number of particles, N =
N1+N2 is taken to be constant (the composite system is isolated), whereas
both N1 and N2 are variables (the two subsystems can exchange particles).
The entropies of both systems, 1 and 2, are now determined in the same
derivation.
Swendsen starts from the probability of having N1 particles in subsys-
tem 1 and N2 = N − N1 particles in subsystem 2, which for a system of
distinguishable individual particles is given by the binomial distribution
P (N1, N2) =
N !
N1!N2!
(
V1
V
)N1(
V2
V
)N2 . (1)
The entropy of the composite system is subsequently taken to be the loga-
rithm of this probability, plus an arbitrary constant (that only changes the
zero of the entropy scale):
S(N1, V1, N2, V2) = k ln
V1
N1
N1!
+ k ln
V2
N2
N2!
. (2)
In Eq. (2) the value of the additive constant has been set to k lnV N/N !,
for reasons of convenience. It is now clear from Eq. (2) that the entropy of
the composite system is the sum of two quantities each of which pertains to
only one of the two subsystems. This suggests introducing the function
S(N, V ) = k ln
V N
N !
(3)
as a general expression for the entropy of a system of volume V and particle
number N . In the limiting situation in which Stirling’s approximation for
the factorials applies, taking into account that in thermodynamical equilib-
rium we will have V1/N1 = V2/N2 (this corresponds to the maximum of the
probability distribution), we find that
k ln
V1
N1
N1!
+ k ln
V2
N2
N2!
≃ k ln
V N
N !
. (4)
This leads to a nicely consistent scheme: If we were to apply the just
sketched procedure for finding the entropy to the composite system itself,
by combining it with a third system, we would find S(N, V ) = k lnV N/N !
for the entropy of the combined system 1+2. As we now see, this entropy
is equal to our earlier defined value in Eq. (2) (fixed by adding the freely
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chosen constant k lnV N/N ! to the logarithm of the probability). So we ob-
tain a consistent set of extensive entropies by taking Eq. (3) as our defining
equation for entropy.
Swendsen claims that in this way the factor 1/N ! in the formula for
the entropy has been demonstrated to be a necessary consequence of the
distinguishability of the gas atoms or molecules. He rejects the formula
S = k lnW and maintains that Boltzmann’s ideas, when pursued rigorously
like in the just described argument, automatically lead to the expression
S = k lnW/N !.
This derivation of S = k lnW/N ! is not convincing, however. First, it
should be observed that its starting point, taking the entropy as k times the
logarithm of the probability in Eq. (1), is not really different from using the
standard formula S = k lnW . This is because the probability P (N1, N2)
is equal to the volume in phase space measuring the number of states with
particle numbers N1 and N2, divided by the (constant) total number of
states. So the logarithm of the probability is, apart from an additive con-
stant, equal to the logarithm of the number of states with N1 and N2. Now,
for the comparison with thermodynamics it suffices to replace this number
of states with the total number of states: in the thermodynamic limit the
probability is peaked, to an extreme degree, around the equilibrium value
and the number of equilibrium states is for all practical purposes equal to the
total number of states—this is explicitly used by Swendsen in his argument
(e.g., Swendsen 2012). Therefore, the entropy of the composite system a` la
Swendsen is, apart from an additive constant, equal to S = k lnW . Now,
what Swendsen effectively does is to fix this additive constant as 1/N !.
There is no problem with this, and exactly the same can be done in the
standard approach, since N—the total number of particles in the compos-
ite system 1+2—is a constant. The N -dependency of S that is introduced
here is introduced by convention, by choosing a different constant in the
definition of S for different values of N .
The next step taken in Swendsen’s derivation is to require that the
entropy of the system 1+2 should have the same value, and the same N -
dependency, in the situation in which it is isolated and the situation in
which N is a variable (when 1+2 is brought into contact with a system 3)—
this is presented as a requirement of consistency. However, this consistency
requirement is exactly the condition that the entropy formula should be
such that there will be no change in entropy when a partition is removed.
So the derivation boils down to showing that by introducing a N -dependent
zero in the definition of the entropy, by convention, the entropy of mixing
can be eliminated. But this is what we knew all along! We were asking for a
fundamental microscopic justification of the division by N !, but Swendsen’s
argument on close inspection only tells us that the division by N ! leads to
a convenient expression that makes the entropy extensive and avoids the
Gibbs paradox. The insertion of 1/N ! is in this case just a convention.
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This verdict should not be taken as a denial of the fact that the dis-
tinguishability of particles is responsible for the occurrence of factorials in
expressions in which particle numbers are variables, like (1) and (2). These
factorials are important in statistical mechanics, for example in predicting
what happens in mixing processes. But it was already argued by Ehrenfest
and Trkal (1920, 1921; see also van Kampen 1984) that these factorials can
be understood within the standard formalism and do not require a change
in the formula S = k lnW for closed systems. Indeed, the dependence of
the total entropy in Eq. (2) on N1 and N2 is unrelated to how N occurs in
this formula (and to the choice of the zero of the total entropy).
The difference between the thermodynamic and
statistical entropies
Our original problem was the difference in behavior between the thermody-
namic and the statistical entropies: upon removal of a partition between two
containers the entropy increases according to statistical mechanics, whereas
it remains the same in thermodynamics. From the point of view of statis-
tical mechanics there is really a change, in the sense that the number of
accessible microstates W objectively increases. In principle we could verify
this empirically, by following the paths of individual particles; we could in
this way even measure the microscopic entropy of mixing in a laboratory
(Dieks 2010). Admittedly, this would require measurements that lead us
outside the domain of thermodynamics. But from the statistical mechanics
point of view these changes in phase volume and entropy must be deemed
completely natural and objective. This already shows that attempts at
eliminating these changes on the basis of arguments on the microscopic
scale are doomed to failure. Our analysis of two of such attempts in the
previous sections has confirmed this.
This leaves us with the discrepancy between the thermodynamic and
statistical entropy. But is there really a problem here? Only if we think of
entropy as a Platonic concept that should be the same in all cases (compare
van Kampen 1984). If we accept that the two entropies are different, the
problem evaporates. After all, entropy is defined differently in statistical me-
chanics than in thermodynamics: in statistical mechanics the fine-grained
micro-description is taken into account as a matter of principle, whereas
in thermodynamics this same micro-description is excluded from the start.
This difference between the statistical mechanical and the thermodynamical
approaches by itself already makes it understandable that the values of en-
tropy changes according to statistical mechanics may sometimes be different
from those in thermodynamics (see for a discussion of the consequences of
this for the second law of thermodynamics: Versteegh 2011).
From a pragmatic point of view it is useful, in many circumstances,
if the two theories give us the same entropy values. We can achieve this
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by a “trick”, namely by introducing a new entropy definition in statistical
mechanics: Replace S = k lnW by S = k ln(W/N !). For systems in which
N is constant this makes no difference for any empirical predictions: it
only adds a constant (though N -dependent!) number to the entropy value.
For situations in which N is made to change, this new definition leads to
the disappearance of the entropy of mixing and extensivity of the statisti-
cal entropy. In this way we obtain agreement with thermodynamics. But
it is important to realize that this “reduced entropy” (as it is called by
Cheng 2009) has no microscopic foundation; rather, it may be interpreted
as the result of a pragmatic decision to erase microscopic distinctions be-
cause we are not interested in them in thermodynamics. The division by N !
is therefore a convention, motivated by the desire to reproduce thermody-
namical results, even though the conceptual framework of thermodynamics
is basically different from that of statistical mechanics. The occurrence of
1/N ! does not necessarily flow from the nature of basic properties of parti-
cles, and attempts to prove otherwise are based on a misconception. (Nor
should we think that quantum mechanics makes an essential difference here:
identical quantum particles can behave just as classical particles in certain
circumstances, which again gives rise to the Gibbs paradox; see Dieks and
Lubberdink 2011, Versteegh 2011.)
So the solution to our problem is simply to admit that there is a dif-
ference between the thermodynamic and the statistical entropy: the ther-
modynamic entropy is extensive, the statistical entropy is not. Given the
different pictures of physical processes painted by thermodynamics and sta-
tistical mechanics, respectively, this difference is only natural.
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